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on  Feeder Routes  in the Far West
Lawrence  Shepard
In anticipation  of the air transportation  regulatory reform act, this paper assesses  the
consequences  of deregulating  the airline industry.  Particular  attention  is devoted to the
impact of deregulation  on air  fares,  travel demand,  and  flight  frequency  for  relatively
short  feeder routes connecting  small cities  and rural centers.  On the basis of a sample  of
routes  in the far western  states,  it appears  that deregulation would raise  fares on routes
shorter  than  100 miles  while  lowering prices  on longer  trunk routes  connecting  major
metropolitan  areas.  Flight frequency on particular routes would be curtailed by approx-
imately  28 percent as airlines  substituted price  competition for nonprice  rivalry under a
new regulatory  regime.
Pending  legislation  contemplates  broad
deregulation  of  the  airline  industry.l  An
abundance  of  research  has  addressed  the
consequences  of such  a policy on prices  and
service  in  long-haul  trunk  lines  connecting
major  metropolitan  areas  [e.g.,  Miller;
Keeler;  Douglas and Miller].  However,  con-
sumer  economists  and  policy  analysts  have
devoted  less attention  to  estimating the  im-
pact  of  regulatory  reform  on  feeder  flights
that  serve  smaller  cities  and  rural  centers.
Traditionally  rural  residents  have  benefited
from  the Civil Aeronautics  Board's fixed fare
structure  which  subsidizes  and  promotes
short  interstate  flights  to remote  areas.  For
this reason,  deregulation measures  designed
to  foster  price  competition  may  raise  fares
and reduce  service  for rural air passengers.
In order to shed  some  light on that ques-
tion,  this  article  examines  the  market  for
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'The Ninety-fourth  Congress has considered H.R.  10261
and H.R. 14604 while the Senate is acting on S. 2551, S.
3364,  and S.  3536.  Concurrently,  the Civil Aeronautics
Board has embarked  upon  an experiment  in regulatory
passenger  travel  on  relatively  short,  regu-
lated  and unregulated  air routes.  After dis-
cussing  the industry's competitive  structure,
the paper develops  an econometric  model of
the  supply  of and demand  for  airline travel.
Frequency of service is also incorporated into
the  analytical  framework.  Data  from  five
western states are employed to assess the po-
tential  effects  of deregulation  on  passenger
travel,  air  fares,  and  flight  frequency  on
feeder  routes  serving  residents  of  nonmet-
ropolitan  areas.
The Airline  Industry
Regulation  of interstate  air  service  falls
within  the purview  of the  Civil Aeronautics
Board  (CAB).  Since  its founding in 1938,  the
Board's  actions  have  been  reflective  of  its
charge  to foster competition  among airlines
only  "to the extent  necessary."  To  this  end,
the  agency  has  tightly  controlled  passenger
fares and routes.  The entry of potential  com-
petitors  has also  been  restricted.  As  a result
no  new trunk line  carriers  have  been estab-
lished  since  the  1930's  despite  dramatic
reform (U.S.  Civil Aeronautics Board).  The prospects  for
substantial  regulatory  reform  are  further enhanced  by
President  Carter's appointment  of Alfred Kahn  as CAB
chairman.  A  regulatory economist  of some  note,  Kahn
has been an outspoken critic of CAB policies (Kahn, pp.
209-220).
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growth in domestic air travel [U.S.  Congress,
p.  3].  Furthermore,  the  Board  has  openly
discouraged  competition between feeder and
trunk  line carriers.2
While  protected from  outside competition
and guaranteed  attractive  fares  by the CAB,
carriers are under strong pressure  to increase
passenger  loads.  For example,  the  chairman
of  a  large  airline  indicates  that  adding  just
one  passenger  to  each  of the  company's
flights  would raise  corporate  after-tax  profits
by approximately  $18 million from an average
annual  level of $3.6 million  over the last ten
years  [Dallos].  In  an  attempt  to  achieve
higher passenger loads; carriers engage in ex-
tensive  nonprice  competition  as  exemplified
by  inflight  entertainment,  bountiful  meals,
"free"  champagne,  reservation  networks,
designer-clad  hostesses,  and in the past,  use
of electric  shavers,  typewriters,  and  sleeper
seats.  This  behavior  is  consistent  with
theoretical  precepts 3 and  has  been  empiri-
cally verified in other industries where prices
are fixed either through regulation  or private
conspiracy  [e.g.,  Kahn;  Phillips;  Shepard].
One of the major modes  of air carrier non-
price  competition  is  through  the  type  of
planes flown.  Because  the CAB prohibits car-
riers  who  operate  older  equipment  from
charging  lower  fares,  firms  are motivated  to
purchase  aircraft  as modern  as  any used by
their  competitors  in  order  to  protect  their
market  shares  [Caves,  pp.  231-32].  Con-
sequently  first  generation  jets  or  their
2In the  Bonanza-TWA  Route Transfer case the CAB  ar-
gues,  "We  recognize  that  some  competition  between
local service carriers  and trunk lines is inevitable but we
intend  not only  to  minimize  such  competition  but  to
prevent its development to the greatest feasible extent;"
10  CAB 893 (1949).
3In  the  words  of Alfred  E.  Kahn,  "If the minimum  rate
regulation  is effective,  it will almost  certainly  hold the
price  above  the  marginal  costs  of some  producers,  to
which competition  would  otherwise  drive it....  But if
competition  is sufficiently  strong,  potentially,  to  drive
price down to that level, it will ordinarily be sufficiently
strong to induce the suppliers,  confronting a price above
their marginal costs, to seek other,  nonprice methods  of
producing  additional  sales."  The  theory  of nonprice
competition  where  prices  are  regulated  is  more  fully
elaborated  by Stigler and,  recently,  White.
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"stretch  jet" progeny  have  been  introduced
on almost all  interstate  routes.  This may im-
pose  special  costs  on  rural  passengers  who
frequent feeder routes where jet aircraft  are
less  efficient  than  smaller  propeller  planes
due to the shorter distances involved and the
lower  population  density  in  rural  regions.
Nevertheless,  the  airline  industry continues
to compete  through widespread introduction
of the  most modem planes,  as illustrated  by
the rapid adoption  of wide-bodied aircraft,  to
which  many  of the  industry's  financial  diffi-
culties  have  been  attributed  ["Insanity
Comes to Air Fares  Again"].  Environmental
considerations  permitting,  supersonic
passenger  aircraft  promise  yet  another
episode  in this type  of rivalry.
The  industry's  distinctive  competitive
scenario  finds  carriers  also  vying  for
passengers through flight frequency.  Airlines
act as though the firm which  offers the  most
flights  on  a  route  will  capture  a  dispro-
portionate  market share [Taneja;  Renard].  As
a  result,  most  city-pairs  are  connected  by
multiple  daily  flights  even  though  these
planes  often fly  half empty.  Miller  presents
compelling  evidence  that  such  competitive
overscheduling  is responsible  for the chronic
excess capacity that exists among airlines (pp.
108-114).  The  capacity  problem  is so  severe
that  the  CAB's  target  load  factor
(passenger-miles  expressed as a proportion of
total seat-miles)  is only 55 percent [Council of
Economic Advisors,  p.  154].  Load factors are
significantly higher on unregulated  intrastate
routes [Keeler,  p.  421].
Intensive nonprice  rivalry in the regulated
sector  of the  air  passenger  service  industry
has  the  effect  of  raising  costs  and,  con-
sequently,  fares.  By  comparing  relatively
competitive  California  intrastate routes  with
interstate  traffic  in the  Northwest  Corridor,
Jordan estimates that fares are  from 47 to 89
percent  higher  where  they  are  determined
by the  CAB rather  than  by  competition  (p.
400).  Employing  a  long-run  cost  model,
T.  E.  Keeler  independently  demonstrates
that  CAB  controlled  fares  reflect  a  48  to  84
percent  markup  over  estimated  unregulatedShepard
fares.  Keeler concludes  that with fares  set at
high cartel levels,  the airlines have competed
away profits through excess  capacity.  On  the
basis  of similar studies  economists,  with  un-
characteristic  unanimity  of opinion,  argue
that deregulation  of air transportation  would
make the industry's service  mix more reflec-
tive  of consumer  preferences  and  reduce
fares  on  interstate  trunk  lines  [e.g.,  Eads;
Jordan;  Kahn].
It is not at all clear,  however,  that pending
legislation  designed  to foster  price competi-
tion  among carriers  would yield lower  fares
on  less frequently  traveled  feeder  routes  to
rural  and  other  nonmetropolitan  areas.
Under  its policy  of  cross-subsidization,  the
CAB has  in the past forced interstate  airlines
to extend service to those areas and to charge
fares  that  are  below  costs  on  those  flights
[Caves,  pp.  401-402,  435-436].  Resulting
losses  are  offset  by  higher  revenues  as-
sociated with the  fares  fixed by the  CAB  on
densely  traveled  trunk  lines  between  large
cities.  The rationale  for cross-subsidization  is
to assure air service on routes that are other-
wise  economically  unviable.  Note  that cross
subsidization  in  favor  of  rural  citizens  is
encountered  in other regulated markets.  For
example,  within  a  given  region  telephone,
power,  freight,  and postage  rates seldom ac-
count  for  the  higher  costs  of  serving  more
sparsely  populated  areas  [Kahn,  pp.  143,
190-2; Turvey].
While  residents  of remote  regions  must
travel  on  feeder  routes  each  time  they  fly,
people  living  in  major  urban  centers  use
those subsidized routes only when they have
nonmetropolitan  destinations.  For  this  rea-
son,  cross-subsidization  has  in  the  past  ef-
fected  a  transfer  from  urban  to  rural
passengers.  Clearly  regulatory  reform aimed
at  reversing  CAB  cross-subsidization  carries
the  potential  of altering  this  scheme.  More
specifically,  under  a  regime  of  market-
determined  prices  carriers  would  likely  at-
tempt  to  reduce  fares  and  expand  market
shares  on profitable  trunk  routes while  rais-
ing rates and restricting  service  on unprofit-
able  feeder  connections.  On  feeder  routes
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flight  frequency  would  continue  to  fall  and
fares would rise until the marginal returns to
carriers  equaled  those  prevailing  on  trunk
lines.  This market response  has been antici-
pated  by  legislators  from  nonmetropolitan
areas  who  have  voiced  opposition  to  air
transportation  regulatory  reform  proposals
[U.S.  Congress,  House  Committee  on
Commerce].  However,  only  fragmentary
quantitative evidence exists about the degree
to which deregulation  would alter air service
to remote  areas.
The Model
In order to analyze  the potential impact of
deregulation  in rural regions  an econometric
model  of the  air  passenger  service  market
was  developed.  The  model consists  of three
structural  equations  simultaneously  deter-
mining  the  demand  for,  supply  of,  and fre-
quency  of air passenger  service:
Quantity  = f(Price,  XY...  Xm)
Price  =  f(Quantity,  Frequency,  Reg-
ulation,  YI...  Yn)
Frequency  =  f(Quantity,  Regulation,  Z 1
...  ZO)
where  X  ...  X,, Y . . . Y,, and Z,...  Zo  are,
respectively,  additional  factors  influencing
travel  demand,  travel  supply,  and flight  fre-
quency.  The  model  was  specified  as  being
linear  in logarithms.  This formulation  allows
direct observation  of relevant elasticities and
conforms  with the  specifications  of previous
researchers  (e.g.,  Mathematica).
In the  transportation  literature  travel  de-
mand  is  commonly  analyzed  using  gravity
models  in which travel  between  two cities  is
assumed to vary with their relative proximity
and some  measure of their "mass"  [Quandt].
Mass,  measured  for example  by  the product
of the  cities'  populations,  is said  to directly
influence  demand  since  the  potential  for
travel increases  with  the number of possible
interactions  between  residents  of  the  city-
pair.  On  the  other  hand,  demand  will  be
lower  the  greater  is  the  separation  of  two
cities as measured  by distance or travel time.
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In the  current  study  it  is hypothesized  that
the  annual  number  of passengers  (Q)  de-
manding  air  travel  between  a  city-pair  de-
pends upon the product  of the cities' popula-
tions (M) and the distance between them (D).
Air  fares  (P)  and  the  population-weighted
mean  income  of the cities  (Y) are also  intro-
duced as determinants  of travel:
In Q  = ao  +al  nP+  a2  nM +  a3 InD + C 4 InY
Travel  demand  is expected  to vary inversely
with price and distance and directly with mass
and income.  Results of previous research sug-
gest  that  the  income  elasticity  (a4)  will  ex-
ceed  1.0  [Verleger,  p.  453].  These  expecta-
tions  about  estimated  coefficients  are  sum-
marized in Table  1.
Airline operating costs have been shown to
depend  primarily  upon  traffic,  length  of
routes,  and type of aircraft  [Keeler,  pp.  403-
412].  For  this  reason,  supply  price  is  as-
sumed  to  vary  with  quantity  of  travel  (Q),
distance  (D),  and flight equipment  (A).  Vari-
able  A is assigned a value of 1 for routes serv-
iced by propeller  aircraft and  a value  of zero
for jet equipment.  Theoretical considerations
suggest that  the  coefficient  on  quantity  will
be  positive  while the  comparative  efficiency
of jet aircraft should give A a negative  impact
on price.  Supply  price  per  mile  has  consis-
tently been  observed to decline  as  distances
increase  [Eads,. pp.  35-39].  This  "fare  taper"








Variable  (InQ)  (InP)  (InF)
InP  O 1 <0
InM  0c 2 >0
InD  a3<0  1 >5 >0  73 <0
InY  e 4 >1
InQ  ,3  >0  '1 >0
InF  >0
R  3 <0  72 >0
RInD  1  >4  >0
RInD,  InD  1 >34 +5  >0
RInD, R  0<e 
- 33/34 <756
InA  6 <0
InN  74>0
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arises because many operating costs as well as
ticketing,  passenger  processing,  baggage
handling,  and  runway  costs  do  not vary pro-
portionately  with  flight  length.  Thus,  the
coefficient on D is expected to have a positive
value of less than one in logarithmic specifica-
tion of the supply function.  With other things
equal,  increased  flight  frequency  reduces
load factors  and raises  costs.  The number  of
daily  flights  (F)  is  accordingly  introduced
into  the  equation.  The  airlines'  regulatory
environment  is  specified  as  a  final  determi-
nant of price.  To  capture  the effects  of CAB
cross-subsidization,  the  variable  R  and  the
multiplicative  term  RlnD  are  included  in  in
the relationship
lnP = Po  +  1 lnQ  + 02 lnF + 03 R + P4 RlnD
+ 05 lnD + P6 A
where R has unitary value  on CAB  regulated
interstate routes  and zero value  elsewhere.
Due  to  cross-subsidization  it  is  hypo-
thesized  that  regulated  fares  are  system-
atically  lower  on short routes  and higher on
longer  routes  than  a  competitive  market
would  sustain.  This  relationship  would  be
confirmed  by  a  significant  negative  coeffi-
cient  on  R  and  a  positive  coefficient  as-
sociated with RlnD.  In this case,  regulation's
impact  on supply  is  neutral  for  the  distance
D'  where
p3  + P4 lnD'= 0 or D' = eP3 /4.
In  the  absence  of  empirical  evidence,  it  is
difficult  to anticipate  the  value  of D'.  How-
ever,  for cross-subsidization  to be  viable for
the  airline  system,  D'  must be  substantially
smaller than the traffic-weighted mean length
of routes in the U. S., which is approximately
756 miles.4 One further set of restrictions  on
the  coefficients  arises:  due  to the fare  taper,
/34  should  lie  between  zero  and  unity  as
should  the  sum  34  + /3  which  represents
the elasticity of price with respect to distance
on regulated routes. The null hypothesis that
regulation  does  not  systematically  influence
4This  measure  is  based  on  the  100  most  frequently
traveled  routes  (U.S.  Civil Aeronautics  Board  1974).
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fares  would  be  substantiated  by coefficients
on R and the multiplicative  term that do not
depart significantly  from zero.
For the supply relationship,  the frequency
with which airlines  offer flights  on particular
routes  depends foremost  on  the  quantity  of
travel  (Q)  [Douglas  and  Miller,  pp.  663-
668].  In  addition,  one  would  expect  to
encounter more flights on routes  served by a
larger number of competiting carriers  (N).  If
the  propensity  of  airlines  to  offer  multiple
flights  is  attenuated  on  more  costly,  long
distance  routes,  coefficient  73  in  the  rela-
tionship
lnF = 70 + 7 lnQ + 72R + y  InD + 74N
would  carry  a  negative  sign.  A  significant,
positive  coefficent  on  R would  confirm  that
regulation  exacerbates  scheduling  competi-
tion.
It  has  been  demonstrated  that  cross-
sectional  analysis  of air travel  should be  re-
stricted  to relatively homogeneous  city-pairs
since  demand  conditions  vary  markedly be-
tween  submarkets  in the  transportation net-
work.  [Verleger,  p.  440].  Accordingly,  the
sample used to test this model includes the 54
direct routes of less than 600 miles which are
served by certificated  air carriers  in Califor-
nia,  Oregon,  Washington,  Idaho,  and
Nevada.  The mean  distance  of sample flights
is 292 miles.  Most routes  in the sample origi-
nate  in  cities  with  fewer  than  75,000  resi-
dents.  Over half of these cities are agricultural
or  lumbering  centers  in  California  and  the
Pacific  Northwest.  A  total  of 24  of the  54
routes cross state boundaries  and,  therefore,
are  subject  to  CAB  regulation.  While  intra-
state  flights  operate  under  state  regulation,
an abundance  of research bears  evidence that
intrastate passenger service  is relatively com-
petitive  [Levine].  With the exception  of four
routes served by propeller driven aircraft  (for
which A  =  1),  first generation jet aircraft was
in  use.  Traffic  and  demographic  data  were
taken  from  government  publications  while
fare,  scheduling,  distance,  and aircraft  infor-
mation  was  acquired  from  industry  sources
[U.S.  Civil  Aeronautics  Board  1974;  Don-
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nelly; U. S. Bureau of the Census].  In all cases
1974  figures were  employed.
Previously  cited  researchers  have  largely
ignored questions  of simultaneity in the  de-
termination  of travel  demand  and  air fares.
This may reflect an assumption that changes in
market  parameters  are  set by regulatory re-
solve rather  than  by market  forces.  In addi-
tion,  empirical evidence indicates that quan-
tity of travel on trunk lines bears a weak statis-
tical  relationship  to  the  level  of  fares  [Ver-
leger, p.  454].  However,  these factors appear
to  be  less  applicable  to  feeder  routes  both
because competition  is intense on many local
lines  and  because  less  expensive  modes  of
transportation represent closer substitutes for
air  transportation  on  short  journeys.  Thus,
quantity  demanded,  supply  price,  and  fre-
quency of service  are assumed to be simulta-
neously determined.  The relationships are es-
timated  using  the  two  stage  least  squares
technique.
Empirical Results
A significant degree  of the variation  in the
endogenous variables Q, P, and F is explained
by  the  model. 5 All  coefficients  in  the  esti-
mated equations  carry expected  signs (Table
2).  However,  the coefficients  on  D in the de-
mand equation,  A in the supply equation, and
D in the frequency of service equation are not
significantly different from zero at the 95 per-
cent level of confidence.
In the demand expression,  mass appears to
be a primary determinant of travel. The coef-
ficient  of  1.02  compares  with  Alcaly's  esti-
mates of 1.06 and 1.49 (p.69).  The estimated
demand  elasticity  of  0.23  compares  with  a
mean value of 0.12 on elasticities reported by
Verleger.  The weaker  responsiveness  of de-
mand to price changes noted by analysts em-
ploying  single  equation  models  may  arise at
least in part from their failure  to  account  for
5Coefficients  of  determination  for  the  reduced  form
equations for Q,  P, and F were .32,  .37, and .29,  respec-
tively.
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TABLE 2: Empirical  Estimates for Interstate  and  Intrastate  Feeder  Routes in the  Far  West  (1974)
Demand  InQ = -0.23  InP + 1.02  InM - 0.61  InD  + 1.50  InY + 5.50
(0.07)  (0.24)  (.49)  (0.36)  (0.84)
Supply  InP  = 0.057  InQ + 0.28  InF - 1.39  R + 0.30  RInD + 0.32  InD-  0.060  A + 6.27
(0.034)  (0.07)  (0.58)  (0.10)  (0.06)  (0.090)  (2.29)
Frequency  InF  = 0.14  InQ + 0.28  R -0.014  InD  + 1.56  InN  + 0.10
(0.04)  (0.16)  (0.010)  (0.13)  (0.10)
= annual  number of passengers between city-pair
= lowest  daytime one-way fare on route
= product of the city's populations (1,000,000's)
= population - weighted  average annual  income
= number of direct daily flights connecting city-pair
regulatory environment  (0,1)
= type of aircraft  (0,1)
= number of competitors
supply interactions.  As expected,  the income
elasticity exceeds 1.0 verifying that an increas-
ing share of increments to income is spent on
air transportation.  Distance,  which  serves as
an impedence factor in travel demand studies,
carries a negative sign but is of marginal statis-
tical  significance.  The  coefficient  -0.61  lies
between Alcaly's values of -.21 and -. 79.  In
separate  analyses,  Richmond  and  Belmont
conclude  that distance  is of questionable  in-
fluence  on air travel  demand.
Increased  output is associated with higher
prices  in  the  supply  equation.  When  com-
bined with the negative demand  relationship
between price and quantity,  this result tends
to affirm the validity of studying this market in
a  simultaneous  framework.  As Table  2  indi-
cates,  high prices also coincide with increased
flight frequency.  The coefficient  on distance,
lying between zero and one, captures the fare
taper.  Type  of aircraft  apparently  has  little
bearing  on  fares,  suggesting  that  on  short
feeder  routes  the  efficiencies  commonly  as-
sociated with jet equipment are not realized.
The  most  frequently  serviced  routes,  of
course,  are  those where  demand  is greatest.
Note,  however,  that a 10 percent increase  in
travel  coincides with the addition of only  1.4
percent more flights. In contrast,  frequency of
service is highly responsive to participation by
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additional  competitors.  For example,  in  re-
sponse to a 10 percent rise  in the number of
airlines  on a typical route it is estimated that
the industry adds between  15 and  16 percent
more flights.  This response  on the part of car-
riers  is consistent with  evidence cited above
that market shares are disproportionately  high
for firms having the most flights on a route.
The cross-sectional  analysis provides tangi-
ble evidence of the impact of CAB regulation.
The  last  equation  in  Table  2  indicates  that
interstate  routes  are  typically  served  by  28
percent  more  flights  than  similar  intrastate
connections.  Based on  sample  means,  regu-
lated  routes  appear  to  have  approximately
three more flights daily. While the CAB over-
sees fares  and routes,  flight frequency  is not
subject  to  direct  regulation  except  on  in-
frequently  traveled  short  routes  that would
not be served at all without CAB intervention.
The  larger  number  of  flights  on  interstate
routes  must  therefore  be  attributed  to  the
competitive behavior of firms operating under
a  regime  of regulated  prices. 6 Accordingly,
6In alternative specifications of the flight frequency equa-
tion, the multiplicative term RlnD proved insignificant.
This  result  may  reflect,  on  the  one  hand,  the CAB's
insistance that very short,  economically  unviable routes
receive  some flight  service and,  on the other,  the pro-











deregulation  can be expected  to have  the ef-
fect of significantly  reducing the frequency of
flights on feeder routes  to rural and nonmet-
ropolitan locations.
Higher fares  also  prevailed  on  CAB  con-
trolled routes.  Using mean values of D, prices
were  on the  average  42  percent higher than
competitively  established  rates.  This  differ-
ence  is  somewhat  lower  than  the  48  to  84
percent estimate by Keeler whose sample was
dominated by long-haul  flights.  The average
markup on routes in Keeler's cost study was 57
percent and the mean distance was 709 miles.
While  this distance  falls outside the range of
the  present  study,  the  empirically  derived
supply  equation  implies  that  regulation  on
routes of this length would raise fares by ap-
proximately
aP  = -1.39  + .30(1n709)= 58 percent. aR  P
This  response  is  very  much  in  line  with
Keeler's  estimate.  Note  that  the  estimated
fare  differential  is  even  greater  for  the
traffic-weighted  mean  distance of U.S.  trunk
routes,  756 miles.
The  results  obtained  above  confirm  that
CAB regulation,  while increasing the average
level  of  fares,  has  differential  impacts  on
flights of differing length.  The positive coeffi-
cient on  the  multiplicative  term  RlnD  indi-
cates  that  regulated  fares  rise  in relation  to
competitively  determined  rates  as  distance
traveled  increases.  Regulation  has  a  neutral
impact on  flights of
D' = e- (- 1.39)/.30  = 103 miles
where interstate  and intrastate fares are  esti-
mated  to  coincide.  The CAB's  rate structure
subsidizes  travelers  on  shorter  routes  by
charging lower fares than a competitive  mar-
ket would sustain while  taxing passengers  on
longer flights. This impact of regulation is cap-
tured in Figure 1 which illustrates the derived
relationship  between  fares  and  distance  in
regulated  and  unregulated  markets  at  mean
values of Q,  F,  and A.
Impacts of Airline Deregulation
Conclusions
This analysis gives insight into policy ques-
tions  surrounding  the  quantitative  effects  of
deregulating  interstate  air  passenger  trans-
portation. First, the data verify the theoretical
prediction  that non-price  competition would
diminish  under  a  regime  of  unregulated
prices.  As a result, interstate air carriers could
be  expected  to  curb  the  number  of flights
offered  on  feeder  routes  by  from  25  to  30
percent  in  the  absence  of  CAB  control.
Moreover,  service  on  some  routes  would
likely be eliminated altogether.  This effect has
been conceded  by the airlines in their vigor-
ous  defense  of existing  regulatory  practices
[U.S.  Congress,  House Commiteee  on Com-
merce].  Fare reductions averaging more than
40 percent are also potentially associated with
reduced  federal  regulation  of air transporta-
tion  pricing  and  entry.  However,  the  data
suggest  that under competition  prices would
rise  on routes  of less than approximately  100
miles.  While these represent a small portion
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FIGURE  1:  Estimated  relationships  between
fares  and  distance  travelled  on  air  routes in the
Far West  (1974)
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small cities  and rural  centers.  Further work
will be required to deduce more precisely the
impact  of deregulation  on  commerce,  de-
velopment  and  migration  in  these  areas.
However,  it is clear that the costs of deregula-
tion would be concentrated  on persons resid-
ing outside major metropolitan  areas while its
benefits would accrue to interurban travelers.
As contemplated in pending legislation,  regu-
latory  reform  can  in general  be  expected  to
produce  a fare  structure  on interstate  routes
which  more  nearly  approximates  intrastate
fares,  as carriers engage in price  competition
and reduce  their services  to a level more re-
flective of consumer preferences.
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